Eu and NATO Relations With Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet Union by Glenn Diesen

Author:Glenn Diesen [Diesen, Glenn]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Peace, Political Science, World, European
ISBN: 9781317140528
Google: prK1CwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 29513616
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-03-09T00:00:00+00:00

The EU’s Considerations and Rejections of Russian Proposals

The common denominator in Russian proposals is to introduce more multilateral institutions with the argument that the existing institutions cause the erosion of the European security architecture. Specific proposals include: developing a common European Security Treaty that includes all states and security institutions operating in Europe (Russian Federation, 2009c); an EU-Russian Union to facilitate free trade and the free movement of people across the pan-European space; an ‘EU-Russia Political and Security Policy Committee’ for common peacekeeping (Russian Federation, 2010a); and a common ‘European energy complex’ that sets rules to balance the interests of energy consumers, producers and transit countries (Russian Federation, n.d.).

Concerning the crisis in Ukraine, following the suspension of the EU’s Association Agreement, Russia argued for trilateral EU-Ukrainian-Russian arrangements to prevent Ukraine from being pushed into civil war; the basic logic being that Ukraine’s stability depends on recognising that, geopolitically, it is two different countries and it cannot remain united if it makes a choice between the West and Russia. Ukraine and Russia therefore proposed a broader definition of European integration that avoids a zero-sum format by developing a multilateral ‘trade commission’ to harmonise tariff levels and make integration efforts compatible (Lynch, 2013).

The proposal for a new European Security Treaty was not rejected by the EU, but quietly ignored by offering positive feedback without engaging in in-depth discussions about the principles or proposing modifications. Arguments in support of the proposal were framed only in terms of influencing Russia rather than accepting Russia as an equal stakeholder in European security. It was ‘a chance for the EU to take a common stand, setting clear red lines including Russia’s commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia’ (European Commission, 2009b). The EU-Russian Union was politely deferred as Chancellor Merkel suggested, ‘we support the idea of a free trade zone between the EU and Russia but I have to pour a bit of cold water on it’ (Pop, 2009b). A common ‘European energy complex’ was rejected, as Ferrero-Waldner asserted that the EU had its own energy charter and ‘the member states will not want to renegotiate everything’ just because of Russia (RT, 2009). The offer of a multilateral alternative in Ukraine to end the crisis was also rejected by the EU. EU Commission President Barroso dismissed the proposal to form a trilateral EU-Russia-Ukraine ‘trade commission’ to harmonise tariff levels and make integration efforts compatible, by equating multilateralism to the acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence: ‘We don’t need a trilateral agreement. The times of limited sovereignty are over in Europe’ (Lynch, 2013).

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